

SPARTA AND SAMOS: A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP?

FOR L. H. JEFFERY

I

The relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States seems to embody most fully the type of the 'special relationship' today. It is a relationship founded ultimately (and now of course remotely) on biological kinship, structured by mutual economic and strategic interests and cemented by a sense of political and 'spiritual' affinity. At least the broad contours of such contemporary 'special relationships' are sufficiently clear.¹ This is far from being the case with those of the Archaic and Classical Greek world, for two main reasons. First, and more decisively, our sources for the history of that world – literary, epigraphical, archaeological – are normally scrappy, discontinuous and variously slanted. Second, and only in part because of the nature of the evidence, the workings of all ancient Greek interstate relationships, whether 'special' or not, are in principle controversial. For in the absence of governments and parties in the modern sense it is frequently impossible to explain confidently a particular foreign policy decision taken by a Greek state.² *A fortiori* it is in principle even more difficult to describe and account for 'special' relationships between states that apparently transcended purely immediate, local and narrowly self-interested considerations.

The most straightforward case of an ancient Greek special relationship is that between a metropolis and its daughter-city or 'colony'.³ The tie, which was founded initially on genuine biological kinship and rested ultimately on religion, was in essence sentimental. Relations between Corinth and some of its colonies, most notably Kerkyra, seem to prove the rule that the special relationship of colony and mother-city did not automatically carry any political or strategic connotations, whether of subordination or partnership. Nor did it necessarily involve economic relations of a public as opposed to a private nature.

Throughout its history Sparta founded just one true colony, Taras (Roman Tarentum, modern Taranto). Its status as a colony is guaranteed by a foundation legend (or rather legends) implying that its foundation was the outcome of a decision of state taken by the *polis* of Sparta properly so called.⁴ The date of the foundation,

¹ See e.g. H. W. Gatzke, *Germany and the United States: A 'Special Relationship'?* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981).

² This is not made clear in Sir Frank Adcock & D. J. Mosley, *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* (London, 1975).

³ J. Seibert, *Metropolis und Apoikie. Historische Beiträge zur Geschichte ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen* (Diss. Würzburg, 1963); A. J. Graham, *Colony and Mother-city in Ancient Greece* (Manchester, 1964); both reviewed by L. H. Jeffery, *JHS* 86 (1966), 242–5; R. Werner, 'Probleme der Rechtsbeziehung zwischen Metropolis und Apoikie', *Chiron* 1 (1971), 19–73; and, for the archaeological evidence bearing on the colonization movement of the eighth to sixth centuries, J. Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas. Their early colonies and trade* (London, 1980). 'Colony' is of course a misnomer: M. I. Finley, 'Colonies – an attempt at a typology', *Trans. Roy. Hist. Soc.*⁵ 26 (1976), 167–88, esp. pp. 169, 173 f., 185.

⁴ P. Benno Schmid, *Studien zu gr. Ktisissagen* (Diss. Freiburg, 1947), pp. 126–8; S. G. Pembroke, 'Locre et Tarente. Le rôle des femmes dans la fondation de deux colonies grecques',

which is corroborated by archaeology, was traditionally given as 706. The literary, epigraphical and archaeological evidence suggests that relations between Sparta and Taras remained close and cordial over a long period, despite their very different geopolitical situations and their radically distinct historical destinies.⁵ However, although Taras was Sparta's only true colony, by the fifth century B.C. four other states were described as 'colonies' of Sparta, and the number thus attributed continued to swell into the Roman period.⁶ This was because *ἀποικία*, which means literally just a 'settlement abroad',⁷ was an elastic term. It could be stretched to apply to interstate relationships which, though not based ultimately on direct biological kinship, none the less involved links close enough to justify the assimilation of the relationships *honoris causa* to the sentimentally closest interstate tie of all, that of metropolis and colony.

As we would expect, no source says and no other evidence implies that Ionian Samos was a colony of Dorian Sparta, even in an extended sense.⁸ Yet although relations between a metropolis and its real or honorary colonies may have been the paradigm, they were not the only case of the special relationship in ancient Greece. Herodotus, for example, provides at least four examples of Archaic special relationships which did not entail the notion of colony at all. One of these, as we shall note, concerns Samos directly, and three of them, including that concerning Samos, involve Sparta indirectly. Such connection between Sparta and Samos in the Archaic period may appear tenuous and hardly sufficient to warrant extended discussion; but two instances of politico-military co-operation that are reported by Herodotus and are not obviously explicable on straightforward pragmatic grounds do require more comprehensive examination than they have received hitherto. This re-examination is particularly desirable since there is both archaeological and epigraphical evidence suggesting far closer links, especially but not exclusively in the sixth century, than the historical and geographical situations of Sparta and Samos would have led us to anticipate. The problem to resolve is the nature of those links. I shall suggest that the answer lies, at least in part, in the existence of a special relationship between the two states, whose character I shall attempt to specify. In a final section I have dealt more

Annales (ESC) 25 (1970), 1240–70. In a humorous passage of the pseudo-Platonic *Hippias Major* (285d) we are told that the Spartans were particularly addicted to such *ἀρχαιολογία*.

⁵ C. M. Stibbe, 'Sparta and Tarent', *Mededelingen van het Nederlands Instituut te Rome* 37 (1975), 1–20; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia. A regional history 1300–362 BC* (London, 1979), pp. 123 f.

⁶ *Fifth century*: Kythera (Thuc. 7. 57. 6), Thera (Pindar, *Pyth.* 5. 72–6; Hdt. 4. 145–50; cf. Strabo 10. 5. 1, C484), Melos (Thuc. 5. 112. 2), Knidos (Hdt. 1. 174. 2). *Fourth century*: Lyktos (Ephorus, *FGrHist* 70F 149. 17; Arist. *Pol.* 2. 10, 1271 b 27–8), Kyrene (Isoc. 5 [*Phil.*] 5). *Roman period*: Magnesia, Alabanda, Kibyra, Synnada, Salagassos, Selge, Amblada – evidence collected in A. M. Woodward, 'Sparta and Asia Minor under the Roman Empire', *Stud. D. M. Robinson II* (St Louis, 1953), pp. 868–83; Lokroi (Paus. 3. 3. 1) – accepted as genuine by Stibbe *Med. Ned. Inst. Rome* 36 (1974), 34 n. 111.

⁷ F. Bilabel, *Die ionische Kolonisation*, etc. (*Philologus* Supp. XIV.1, 1920), pp. 6–9; E. Blumenthal, *Die altr. Siedlungskolonisation im Mittelmeerraum, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Südküste Kleinasiens* (Tübingen, 1963), pp. 15–22.

⁸ Traditionally, the settlers of Samos did include Peloponnesians from Epidauros, but these would have been pre-Dorians: Paus. 7. 4. 1–3; cf. 2. 26. 2; Iambl. *Vita Pyth.* 2. 3. Herodotus' 'Dorians of Epidauros' (1. 146. 1) is probably an anachronistic reference to these. For the literary traditions see generally M. B. Sakellariou, *La migration grecque en Ionie* (Athens, 1958), pp. 93–106. (I am indebted to M. H. Jameson for a personal communication on this point.) For the archaeological evidence bearing on the early settlement of Samos see Boardman (n. 3), pp. 30 and 268 n. 22. An excellent brief summary of the geography and history of Samos is given by Ernst Meyer, *Der kleine Pauly* IV (Munich, 1975), coll. 1534–7.

briefly with the couple of occasions in the subsequent fifth century on which relations between Sparta and Samos appear to have been comparably close.

II

Perhaps the best way of approaching our problem is to focus on the second of the two instances of politico-military co-operation just mentioned and to ask a deceptively simple question: why in (probably) 525 did the Spartans decide to respond positively to a request from some Samian exiles to restore them to power by overthrowing the usurping tyrant Polykrates? To answer this fully would involve consideration of at least the following topics: the nature and quality of Herodotus as a historical source; the relation between literary and non-literary evidence for early Greek history; the considerations governing foreign policy, and the structure and location of trade, in Archaic Greece; the decision-making process in Sparta; the Messenian Wars; the origins of the Peloponnesian League; and the balance of power in the Aegean in the second half of the sixth century. But it would be inappropriate to consider all these topics equally exhaustively here. It may, however, prove useful to present together all the available evidence bearing on the Spartans' decision and to suggest a somewhat fresh way of looking at it.

Our prime source for political relations between Sparta and Samos in the Archaic period is Herodotus 3. 39–60. This is in fact just one in his strikingly long series of digressions on the history and antiquities of Samos before the Persian Wars of 480–79.⁹ From this and other tell-tale indications – for example, Samos is described as being in *c.* 517 'the first of all Greek and non-Greek *poleis*' (3. 139. 1) – it was already deduced in antiquity that the historian, though a Dorian from Halikarnassos, had had close personal connections with the island. Indeed, Douris, the pro-Macedonian tyrant and local historian of Samos in the years around 300 B.C., went so far as to claim Herodotus for a fellow-citizen (*FGrHist* 76F 64).¹⁰ But this seems to have been a sacrifice of historical truth on the altar of patriotism. On the other hand, the story preserved in the Byzantine *Suda* lexicon (s.v. *Ἡρόδοτος*) of a sojourn on Samos following expulsion on political grounds from Halikarnassos looks plausible enough.¹¹ What concerns us here are the possible effects this sojourn may have had on the composition of those portions of the *Histories* dealing jointly with Sparta and Samos.

In his still fundamental *Pauly* article, Jacoby rightly rejected the theory that Herodotus first composed a Xerxes-history on Samos and only later modified this original plan.¹² He did, though, accept that the Halikarnassian's warm sympathy for

⁹ These are discussed from varying standpoints by H. R. Immerwahr, 'Herodotus' Samian stories', *CJ* 52 (1957), 312–22; J. Cobet, *Herodots Exkurse und die Frage der Einheit seines Werkes* (*Historia Einzelschr.* XVII, 1971), pp. 159–69; B. M. Mitchell, 'Herodotus and Samos', *JHS* 95 (1975), 75–91; R. Tölle-Kastenbein, *Herodot und Samos* (Bochum, 1976), which is usefully reviewed by Mitchell, *JHS* 98 (1978), 194f.

¹⁰ R. B. Kebric, *In the Shadow of Macedon: Douris of Samos* (*Historia Einzelschr.* XXIX, 1977), p. 38; on Douris as a historian see L. Ferrero's aptly titled 'Tra poetica ed istorica: Duride di Samo', in *Miscellanea di studi alessandrini in memoria de A. Rostagni* (Turin, 1963), pp. 68–100.

¹¹ Reconstruction of Herodotus' life and outlook depends chiefly on inferences from the *Histories*, but a contemporary Halikarnassian inscription (M/L 32) has been used to corroborate the tradition that Herodotus opposed the tyranny of Lygdamis, the grandson (or perhaps rather son or nephew) of Herodotus' Artemisia. However, this tradition 'has no reflection at all in the history': K. H. Waters, *Herodotus on Tyrants and Despots. A study in objectivity* (*Historia Einzelschr.* XV, 1971), p. 42.

¹² F. Jacoby, 'Herodotos', *RE Supp.* II (Berlin, 1913), coll. 220–3, 228 f.; photographically reprinted in his *Gr. Historiker* (Stuttgart, 1956). My own, inexpert impression of Herodotus'

Samos was evinced because the island had given him and his family refuge from the political troubles at home, and he stressed (col. 222) the historian's 'very intimate knowledge of Samian history, antiquities, cults (III 48) and monuments (III 60), individual families and their traditions, in general a far-reaching local familiarity'. It is the penultimate item on this list that has been insisted upon recently by Barbara Mitchell: 'Taken as a whole, Herodotus' Samian material suggests that he was not only sympathetic towards Samos but that in particular he reflects the view of the aristocratic group which came to power after Mykale [479] and was opposed both to tyranny and to medism'.¹³ This conclusion seems to me essentially correct, and I shall return to this aristocratic group in section VI. What matters here is that it was the ancestors of Herodotus' aristocratic Samian friends who, I believe, successfully appealed to Sparta for help towards their restoration in 525.¹⁴

The circumstances of the Samians' appeal, in the account of Herodotus (3. 39–43), were these. Polykrates had made himself tyrant of Samos by a coup.¹⁵ Soon after, he had entered into a compact of guest-friendship (*ξενίη*) with Amasis, ruler of Egypt, and had then proceeded to carve out for himself something of a naval empire in the eastern Aegean. Frightened by this overweening prosperity, Amasis had reluctantly broken off his compact with Polykrates. Thus Herodotus; but in reality, as Herodotus' own subsequent narrative makes plain, it was Polykrates who broke off relations with Amasis by offering to aid the Persian king Cambyses in his projected invasion of Egypt.¹⁶ In a characteristic display of opportunism Polykrates despatched to Egypt in forty triremes those of the Samian citizens whom he suspected as being the most prone to foment revolt against his rule (3. 44. 2).¹⁷

The ships, however, failed to reach their intended destination. What happened between their despatch from Samos and their arrival in Lakonia was variously reported – an interesting reflection on the quality of Herodotus' Samian sources,¹⁸ but there seems to have been a single version of how the fugitives persuaded the Spartans to restore them (3. 46). They made a long speech of appeal before the Spartan *ἄρχοντες*, to which the latter replied uncharitably that by the end they had forgotten the beginning and that they had not understood the remainder. So when the Samians appealed again, some (unspecified) time later, they brought in an empty grain-sack and merely remarked that it lacked barley meal. Once more the Spartans criticized the form of the Samians' request, but they did agree to help them.

intellectual development is that his overarching scheme of Graeco-Barbarian relations culminating in the Persian Wars was conceived early on in his researches.

¹³ Mitchell (n. 9).

¹⁴ For the chronology and chronography – but for these alone – see M. Miller, *The Thalassocracies. Studies in Chronography* II (Albany, 1971), pp. 22–39, at 31.

¹⁵ In fact against the aristocratic-oligarchic régime of the Geomoroi or 'Landsharers'; H. Stein, *Herodotos*⁶ (Berlin, 1883) thought that something like *τοῖς πᾶσι* ('against the rich') might have dropped out of the MSS of 3. 39. 1. See also J. Labarbe, 'Un putsch dans la Grèce antique. Polycrate et ses frères à la conquête du pouvoir', *Ancient Society* 5 (1974), 21–41. On the vexed question of the circumstances of Polykrates' accession see further n. 70.

¹⁶ For this conflict in Herodotus between sober historical narrative and moralizing fiction (the folkloristic anecdote of Polykrates' ring) see G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, 'Herodotus', *GR*² 24 (1977), 130–48, at p. 145.

¹⁷ Presumably the suspects Polykrates had chiefly in mind were Geomoroi, but by themselves these could not possibly have manned forty triremes, whose full complement should have been around 8000 men. C. G. Cobet therefore suggested that 'forty' was a corruption in transmission of 'four', Stein (n. 15) that the suspects were sent not as rowers but as marines. Other explanations of the numerical difficulty are possible too.

¹⁸ As was noted by A. H. Sayce, *Herodotus I–III* (London, 1883) ad 3. 45; cf. B. Niese, 'Herodotstudien, besonders zur spartanischen Geschichte', *Hermes* 42 (1907), 419–68, at pp. 426–40, for some general remarks on 'Herodots einheimische Gewährsleute'.

It is not necessary here to go into the textual and other difficulties raised by this anecdote, which is retailed by other sources in variant forms (Plut. *Mor.* 223d, 232d; Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 2. 23).¹⁹ But the typically Herodotean disregard for the technical niceties of political and diplomatic procedure cannot be overlooked. For although Herodotus uses the formal vocabulary appropriate to a diplomatic audience, he conceals the precise identity both of the Samian appellants and of the Spartan ἄρχοντες, and it is not made clear whether it was within the sole discretion of the latter to accept or reject the Samians' appeal.

Besides, Herodotus is manifestly more interested in reporting a nice tale illustrative of a peculiarly Spartan trait than he is in conveying adequately the range of arguments deployed by the Samians. Instead, he resorts to his preferred historiographical technique (cf. 7. 152. 3) and simply records the contradictory views expressed to him some seventy-five years later by his Spartan and Samian informants (or some of them) on the Spartans' motive in 525 for agreeing to undertake an expedition against Polykrates. According to Herodotus' 'Samians', the Spartans did so to reciprocate a favour done to them at an unspecified earlier date by the Samians, namely the lending of naval assistance against the Messenians. According to his 'Spartans', on the other hand, their forebears had sought revenge for two acts of Samian piracy on the high seas. The first of these, already described elsewhere by Herodotus (1. 70), involved an elaborate bronze mixing-bowl sent by the Spartans to seal a compact of guest-friendship and alliance with King Croesus of Lydia; the second an embroidered linen corslet sent to the Spartans by Amasis, perhaps for similar reasons.²⁰

A juxtaposition of 3. 47. 1 and 1. 70. 2–3 is revealing of Herodotus' historical methods. In the former passage 'the Spartans' are permitted to rebut the motive ascribed to the Spartans of 525 by 'the Samians'. Herodotus does not himself express a preference either directly or indirectly: he *berichtet* the alleged motives not *behauptet* them, as Stein noted. But in the matter of the mixing-bowl, where 'the Spartans' and 'the Samians' disagreed as to how it had ended up in the Samian Heraion, Herodotus does at least pass judgement indirectly on the facts of the case. At 3. 48. 1 he synchronizes a Samian outrage committed against Periander (below) with what he, like his 'Spartans', calls the theft (ἄρπαγή) of the bowl. He seems to agree, in other words, with 'the Spartans' that the bowl had been stolen in a public act of piracy rather than, as 'the Samians' claimed, privately bought and dedicated in the Heraion. This is a valuable reminder that Herodotus need not be the slave of his informants, even informants to whom he was bound by close ties of personal obligation and political sympathy. None the less, it cannot automatically be inferred that he also preferred his Spartan informants' version of Spartan motives in 525 to the one given by his Samian informants. Apart from anything else, there is the complicating factor of the rôle played by the Corinthians in 525.

According to Herodotus (3. 48. 1), these helped the Spartans 'eagerly' against Polykrates from a motive of revenge similar to that alleged by 'the Spartans'. This

¹⁹ See now Labarbe, 'Les rebelles samiens à Lacédémone (Hérodote, III, 46)', in *Hommages à Claire Préaux* (Brussels, 1975), pp. 365–75. Labarbe prefers *περιεργάσασθαι* to the *περιεργάσθαι* of the MSS and translates 'they should put their excessive zeal in the service of their sack'.

²⁰ It seems clear that Herodotus had actually seen the bowl and corslet in the Heraion: G. Dunst, 'Archaische Inschriften und Dokumente der Pentekontaëtie aus Samos', *AM* 87 (1972, publ. 1974), 99–163, at pp. 122 f.; Tölle-Kastenbein (n. 9), pp. 60–2, 108. The practice of sending a krater as a gift was possibly a Lydian custom in origin; cf. Hdt. 1. 14. 3 (Gyges), 25. 2 (Alyattes), 51. 1 (Croesus). The krater sent by the Spartans was perhaps of the type of the Vix krater: Boardman, *Greeks Overseas*, pp. 100 f. and fig. 261. For Samian piracy see n. 69; for the alliance or alliances, n. 75.

time, though, Herodotus allows no contradictory Samian testimony (it was left to a querulous Plutarch to provide it for them: *Mor.* 859b–d); and he states as a fact that in the previous generation the Samians had intercepted and liberated the 300 Kerkyraian boys who had been despatched by the Corinthian tyrant Periander for service as eunuchs at the court of Alyattes (father of Croesus).²¹ However, even if we accept that Herodotus has reported the motive officially professed by the Corinthians in 525, we cannot refrain from noticing here a dereliction of the historian's duty comparable and directly connected to that observed in his account of the Spartan decision to respond to the Samians' appeal. He does not explain either the nature of the relationship between Sparta and Corinth before and in 525 or the basis on which they decided to co-operate against Polykrates in that year.

To sum up this discussion of Herodotus, he does not commit himself to the truth of either motive alleged by his Spartan and Samian informants. He does, though, report the same motive of revenge in the case of the Corinthians and without giving any contradictory testimony. This may perhaps just slightly suggest that, if pressed to choose between revenge and reciprocity, Herodotus would have opted for the former; but it is of course also conceivable that he would have been prepared to allow each of them equal weight.

However that may be, one thing is tolerably clear. Almost without exception modern scholars have been unable to accept that revenge provides a sufficient explanation for the joint action of Sparta and Corinth against Polykrates. How and Wells were therefore expressing a more or less *communis opinio* when they invoked in this context what they considered to be a general defect of Herodotus' *Histories* as a whole, his 'tendency to confuse occasions with real causes'.²² It has to be admitted that Herodotus did leave the door open to this and other modern objections by his failure to place the Spartans' decision within a wider historical context and to discuss its institutional bases. But in his pioneering study of Corinth, Edouard Will forcefully argued that the alleged motive reported by Herodotus was clearly found plausible in the mid-fifth century and so was *a fortiori* plausible for the late sixth, and further that this alleged motive was less improbable than the rival variants urged by modern scholars.²³ Since, as we shall see, none of these rival variants is unassailably correct or even demonstrably preferable to any of the others, Will was clearly right to redirect attention to Herodotus. Even he, though, went well beyond the evidence the latter provides,²⁴ and the last word has not been said in Herodotus' defence. It is within this framework that I would like to introduce the notion of a special relationship between Archaic Sparta and Samos.

III

It was noted in section I that Herodotus provides at least four examples of Archaic special relationships which did not involve the notion of colony. The most celebrated

²¹ For the fierce chronological and/or textual difficulties of this passage see e.g. Ed. Will, *Korinthiaka* (Paris, 1955), p. 13; T. J. Cadoux, *JHS* 76 (1956), 105 f. (extremely critical of Herodotus 3. 47–9 as a whole). They are explained away, rather too neatly, as 'artistic licence' by Ph.-E. Legrand, 'De la "malignité" d'Hérodote', *Mél. Gustave Glotz* II (Paris, 1932), pp. 534–47, at 536–8. See also n. 83.

²² W. W. How & J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* I (Oxford, 1928), p. 269; for their general discussion of what they saw as Herodotus' defects as a historian see *ibid.*, pp. 43–6.

²³ Will (n. 21), pp. 625–38; at p. 634 he remarks on 'cette mentalité agônale archaïque' (italics in the original).

²⁴ I return in section V to his suggestion that the Spartans were acting under constraint from the eager Corinthians.

of these four, perhaps, was that between Ionian Miletos and Italian Sybaris, which was founded by Achaians from north Peloponnese. In 510, we are told (Hdt. 6. 21), all Milesians of military age donned mourning garb on learning of the destruction of Sybaris by Kroton. The authenticity of this story is not above suspicion, but what matters here is the explanation of it given virtually unanimously, though with varying degrees of caution, by modern historians, namely that the two states had been linked in some way by trade.²⁵ The fact that there is apparently only one piece of ancient literary evidence to be adduced in support of this interpretation, and that late and not obviously relevant (Timaios, *FGrHist* 566 F 50), is not a crushing counter-argument, given the general lack of interest in economic affairs shown by historians in antiquity. But the connection between trade and politics, if any, in Archaic Greece and indeed the very nature of Archaic trade are far more problematic and complex matters than a simple citation of this one literary text would suggest.²⁶ In my view it is out of the question that the disappearance of even a lucrative market for Milesian wool or wool-products should have been sufficient to provoke the demonstrative reaction in Miletos that Herodotus graphically records.

It is perhaps even harder to see how trade enters into the other three equations, the special relationships between Knidos and Taras (3. 138. 2), Thera and Samos, and Kyrene and Samos (4. 152. 5).²⁷ On the other hand, it leaps to the eye – or at least to my possibly jaundiced eye – that the highest common factor here is Sparta: genuine metropolis of Taras and honorary metropolis (at least by the fifth century) of Knidos and Thera;²⁸ ‘grandmother-city’ of Kyrene, which was itself a true colony of Thera;²⁹ and, if Herodotus’ ‘Samians’ are to be believed, beneficiary as well as would-be benefactor of Samos in the Archaic period. Or rather – and here, I think, lies the clue to the nature of these special relationships – beneficiary and would-be benefactor of certain Samian aristocrats.

The Archaic Greek world had no governments and political parties as we know them, and it was a world without conscious political theory. What we rather grandly call interstate relations in the Archaic period were therefore mostly at bottom personal (and often hereditary) relations between ruling aristocrats. The development of Greek diplomacy cannot be traced with precision, but its general outlines are adequately

²⁵ How & Wells, op. cit. II, p. 71; T. J. Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks* (Oxford, 1948), pp. 78 f.; A. R. Burn, *The Lyric Age of Greece* (London, 1960; repr. 1978), p. 187 and n. 9; C. G. Starr, *The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece 800–500 B.C.* (New York, 1977), p. 176; Boardman, *Greeks Overseas*, pp. 179, 203; T. J. Figueira, *Aegina. Society and Politics* (New York, 1981), p. 267; etc. Notable exceptions are K. Bücher, *Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Tübingen, 1922), pp. 42–4; and J. Hasebroek, *Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece* (Tübingen, 1928; Engl. trans. London, 1933), p. 109.

²⁶ See now A. M. Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece. The age of experiment* (London, 1980), chap. 4.

²⁷ Trade nevertheless has been advanced in explanation of them: for Knidos and Taras, L. H. Jeffery, *Archaic Greece. The city-states c. 700–500 B.C.* (London, 1976), p. 199; for Kyrene and Samos, D. White, ‘Archaic Cyrene and the cult of Demeter and Persephone’, *Expedition* 17. 4 (Summer, 1976), 2–15, at p. 6.

²⁸ Evidence for connections between Sparta and Knidos is collected in D. M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden, 1977), p. 97 n. 68; add the Spartan called Knidis (n. 37). Dispute over the site of Archaic Knidos complicates attempts to establish archaeological links: see now *AR* 1978–79, 82 f. Possible connections between Sparta and Thera include the Ephorate, the cults of Apollo Karneios and the Dioskouroi, and – more doubtfully – institutionalized pederasty.

²⁹ One Spartan, the athlete Charmis, was supposed to have participated in the foundation of Kyrene in c. 630: Paus. 3. 14. 3. For relations between Sparta and Kyrene generally see Lila Marangou, ‘Aristaios’, *AM* 87 (1972, publ. 1974), 77–83, at pp. 82 f.; Boardman, *Greeks Overseas*, pp. 147, 157. And see n. 48.

clear.³⁰ At its roots lay the institution of guest-friendship, already an elaborated system in the Homeric poems;³¹ for 'happy is the man', as Solon (fr. 23 West) put it, 'with a friend in foreign parts'. This was a peculiarly aristocratic form of happiness.

We happen to have literary evidence for just such a personal connection involving Sparta and Samos in the fifth century, although by then, as we would expect, the purely personal relationship had almost certainly been institutionalized in the form of *προξενία* (literally 'substitute guest-friendship').³² Very rarely indeed does Herodotus name his informants individually.³³ But at 3. 55 he tells us that he met a Spartan called Archias in his village of Pitana (one of the smarter quarters of Sparta)³⁴ and that Archias 'honoured Samians above all other foreigners' (3. 55. 2). Archias is thus very probably the source of at least some of the opinions and assertions Herodotus puts into the mouth of 'the Spartans' in his Samian sections, and Herodotus had no doubt been given his introduction to Archias by their mutual aristocratic Samian friends.³⁵ But, despite Herodotus' characteristically untechnical language in the sentence quoted above, Archias was almost certainly also the (or a) Samian *proxenos* at Sparta around the middle of the fifth century.³⁶

The *proxenia* of a state was very often, if not usually, a hereditary office, as we would perhaps expect from the hereditary character of the institution of *xenia* out of which it grew. It may therefore be suggested that not only Herodotus' Archias (II) but also his father, symptomatically named Samios ('the Samian'),³⁷ and his grandfather, another Archias (I), had held the Samian proxeny. The latter, as his grandson piously informed Herodotus, had died heroically during the (unsuccessful) forty-day siege of

³⁰ See generally Adcock & Mosley (n. 2); E. Olshausen (ed.), *Antike Diplomatie* (Darmstadt, 1979); on Spartan diplomacy, mainly in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, see Mosley *ibid.*, pp. 183–203.

³¹ On guest-friendship and the associated nexus of gift-exchange see M. I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*² (London, 1978), Index s.vv.

³² *Proxenoí*, citizens of state A resident in state A but representing the interests in various spheres of citizens from another state B, are attested from around 600: M. B. Wallace, 'Early Greek proxenoí', *Phoenix* 24 (1970), 189–208; *id.*, *Athenian Proxeny of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Toronto & Sarasota, 1978), pp. 2–4; cf. generally F. Gschnitzer, 'Proxenos', *RE Supp.* XIII (1973), coll. 629–730.

³³ The other two certain examples are Tymnes (4. 76. 6) and Thersandros (9. 16. 5). George Grote, *A History of Greece*, new edn in 10 vols (London, 1888), III. 456, considered that, had Herodotus regularly so specified his informants, 'the value as well as the interest of his history would have been materially increased'.

³⁴ Pitana was where the senior royal house, the Agiadaí, lived and had their burial-ground: Paus. 3. 14. 2 ff. Other passages suggesting Pitana's superior status are Pindar, *Ol.* 6. 28; Eur. *Tro.* 112 ff.; Plut. *Mor.* 601b.

³⁵ A. Schöll, 'Herodots Entwicklung zu seinem Beruf', *Philologus* 10 (1855), 25–81, at p. 32; Jacoby (n. 12), coll. 222 f. The meeting took place around 450, perhaps after the conclusion of the Thirty Years' Peace in 446/5.

³⁶ Dunst (n. 20), 142. How & Wells state categorically, but without foundation, that 'Archias was ἐθελονπρόξενος (Thuc. iii. 70) of Samos at Sparta'.

³⁷ Herodotus says he acquired the name because of his father's glorious achievement (ἀριστεία) at Samos in 524. This is possible, but I wonder whether Herodotus has not simply made a false inference from the posthumous honour accorded Archias I by the Samians (n. 40). For names of the Samios type, foreign ethnics, are not unparalleled in Sparta (numbers in brackets refer to P. Poralla, *Prosopographie der Lakedaimonier bis auf die Zeit Alexanders des Grossen* [Breslau, 1913]): Athenaios (32), Boiotios (175), Thessalos (367), Knidis (449), Libys (490), Olyntheus (577), Skythes (668), Chalkideus (743). Conversely, the Archaic Samian named Lakon (Iambl. *Vit. Pyth.* 267) would have been the scion of a family with Spartan ties; cf. the Plataian Lakon, *proxenos* of Sparta in 427: Thuc. 3. 52. 5. Poralla's other Samios (659) is presumably Samios II, son of Archias II; and it has been suggested that Samios II was father of Pythagoras (652), who bears a good Samian name: R. Sealey, *Klio* n. f. 58 (1976), 349 f.

Samos in 524.³⁸ But so too had another Spartan Lykopas.³⁹ Yet of the two heroes only Archias I apparently was honoured subsequently with a public funerary monument by the Samians.⁴⁰ It could be argued that Lykopas had no friends in Samos and that Archias was exceptional in this respect. Still, this public monument for Archias, together with the name given to his son, seems to me consistent with the hypothesis that the Samian proxeny had been vested in the family at least by the time of Archias I.

If this hypothesis is correct, then it becomes possible to find a rôle in the Samian events of 525–4 for the Spartan kings, who are conspicuous in Herodotus by their absence.⁴¹ For it was one of the ancient prerogatives of the kings, according to Herodotus (6. 57. 2), to appoint *proxenoi* from among the Spartan citizens. Mosley has rightly remarked on the oddity of this, since normally the state concerned chose its own *proxenos* or *proxenoi*.⁴² He is wrong, though, in my view to suggest that this royal prerogative was not a matter of politics. It is true that Herodotus does not say the kings were entitled to appoint 'the' or 'all' *proxenoi*, but it does not follow that none of those *proxenoi* whom they did select was in any sense a political appointee. If, then, Archias I was *proxenos* of the Samians, the fact that the kings (or a king) had seen fit to appoint a Samian *proxenos* at some time before 525 should signify that connections between Sparta and Samos were by then relatively intense. In itself, however, such an appointment would be far from constituting a special relationship between the two states. This is the moment, therefore, to turn to the evidence apart from Herodotus that links them in the Archaic period.

IV

The other literary sources are generally unhelpful or inconclusive. Aristotle (fr. 611 Rose = Herakl. Lembos 372–3. 10 Dilts) credited Lykourgos with bringing back the

³⁸ The expedition and siege are described at Hdt. 3. 39. 1, 44. 1, 54–6; cf. Polyainos 1. 23; Plut. *Mor.* 859–60. The main reason for the Spartan (and Corinthian) failure was the existence of Samos' stout, four kilometre circuit-wall – Phase I in the scheme of H. J. Kienast, *Samos XV. Die Stadtmauer von Samos* (Bonn, 1978). The story that Polykrates bribed the Spartans with an *ad hoc* issue of gilded lead coins is dismissed by Herodotus (3. 56. 2); but Polykrates does seem at one time to have struck an emergency issue of lead staters, possibly once gilded with electrum foil, and these may have given rise to the story: E. S. G. Robinson, 'Some electrum and gold coins', *ANS Centennial vol.*, ed. H. Ingholt (New York, 1958), pp. 585–94, at 592 f.; cf. C. M. Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins* (London, 1976), pp. 29 f.

³⁹ Herodotus allows hospitality to get the better of his judgement when he writes that, if all the other Lakedaemonians had been the peers of Archias and Lykopas, Samos would have been taken (3. 55. 1). This was the stuff of mess-talk: F. Ollier, *Le mirage spartiate* 1 (Paris, 1933), p. 109; cf. 124 ff.

⁴⁰ This monument is also mentioned by Plutarch (*Mor.* 860d). Stein (n. 15) dated it after Mykale since it was only then that the Polykratean tyrant house was finally overthrown (cf. n. 92). On the other hand, the visit to Sparta in c. 517 of Polykrates' successor Maiandrios (Hdt. 3. 148) would seem to imply reasonably friendly relations, if it is not actually an instance of the special relationship in action; and Maiandrios might have sanctioned the erection of such a monument after Polykrates' death in c. 522 – especially if, as Mrs Mitchell has suggested to me, he had been among the exiles of 525.

⁴¹ Plut. *Mor.* 223d (7) attributes a version of Hdt. 3. 46 (the Spartans' response to the Samian appellants) to Kleomenes I, but this is probably due to an understandable desire to personalize the account of Herodotus, whose sources are unlikely to have omitted any genuine participation by Kleomenes. On the rôle of the kings in foreign policy see further section V.

⁴² D. J. Mosley, 'Spartan kings and proxeny', *Athenaeum* n.s. 49 (1971), 433–5; cf. Wallace (n. 32), 198: 'the kings placed a kind of liturgic obligation on prominent Spartans to look after certain foreigners'.

Homeric poems from Samos to the Peloponnese; but this is just the sort of anecdote that would tend to become attached to a chronologically fluid wonder-worker like Lykourgos. With greater historical specificity Theodoros of Samos is said to have been hired by the Spartans to design the Skias (meeting-place of the Spartan assembly) in c. 550 (Paus. 3. 12. 10); but even if true, the hiring of such an internationally renowned master-craftsman tells us nothing about interstate relations. Similarly, when Polykrates is alleged by the local Samian historian Alexis (*FGrHist* 539F2) to have imported Lakonian hounds, no political significance can be read into his action. Finally, Nilsson thought there might be a connection between Artemis Lygodesma at Sparta and the Samians' patron goddess Hera, whose cult-statue was enveloped in *λύγροι* (withies or willow-twigs); but the date and nature of the connection are unfathomable and its very existence has anyway been firmly denied by Kipp.⁴³

The archaeological and art-historical evidence, in sharp contrast, is far richer, even if its interpretation is problematic. The most plentiful category is decorated pottery. The earliest certainly Lakonian pot known to have found its way outside mainland Greece, apart from the tableware taken to Satyrion and Taras by the first Spartan settlers,⁴⁴ is a Subgeometric krater of the early seventh century, two joining fragments of which were excavated in the Samian Heraion.⁴⁵ Rather more Lakonian vases of the second half of the seventh and first quarter of the sixth centuries reached the same destination; though few in number, they are all the more significant in that Lakonian potters and painters were not yet working for export.⁴⁶ But after about 580/75 the amount of Lakonian black-figure vases, mainly kylikes, found on Samos (not just at the Heraion) becomes really striking, as a proportion both of the total number known to have been produced in Sparta⁴⁷ and of the foreign pottery reaching Samos in the sixth century.

Almost fifty sites outside Lakonia, extending from north-east Spain to Syria and from Egypt to north-west Turkey, have yielded some Lakonian black figure, usually just a couple of pieces.⁴⁸ Yet of the 360 pieces catalogued by Stibbe no less than 110 or 28% were found on Samos. Nearly all of these were dedicated to Hera, but half

⁴³ M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der gr. Religion* 1³ (Munich, 1967), p. 430; G. Kipp, 'Zum Hera-Kult auf Samos', in F. Hampl & I. Weiler (eds), *Kritische und vergleichende Studien zur alten Geschichte und Universalgeschichte* (Innsbruck, 1974), pp. 157–209, at 158. However, the Lakonian terracotta protome depicting a goddess (?) which was dedicated at the Heraion (n. 64) might imply that one Spartan or Samian saw a resemblance. See also text and n. 117.

⁴⁴ See Stibbe and Cartledge (n. 5).

⁴⁵ The Berlin fragment was published as Late Geometric by E. Diehl, *AA* 1964, 543; but it seems to me rather to belong to the Subgeometric stream of the following Transitional phase. The other fragment is in the Vathy Museum, Samos, where – thanks to the courtesy of the Greek Archaeological Service and of Professor A. Mallwitz, then director of the German Archaeological Institute in Athens – I was able to study it and other Lakonian material in 1970.

⁴⁶ Lakonian I and II ware, as yet not fully published; cf. Stibbe (n. 5), 18 n. 89.

⁴⁷ I stress that I am here concerned only with *decorated* ware. C. M. Stibbe is preparing a comprehensive study of Lakonian plain ware, which is bound to affect somewhat conclusions drawn from the decorated ware alone. Meanwhile, plain Lakonian aryballoi and kraters are known to have been found on Samos: B. B. Shefton in T. J. Dunbabin (ed.), *Perachora II* (Oxford, 1962), pp. 383 n. 1, 385n.

⁴⁸ Lakonian was the third most widely distributed sixth-century fabric after Attic and Corinthian (down to c. 550); but distribution was everywhere thin, except to Samos, Olympia, Taras, Cyrenaica and Etruria: see generally Stibbe, *Lakonische Vasenmaler des sechsten Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Amsterdam & London, 1972). Since this basic publication more Lakonian has been identified at several sites, notably Halieis, Gravisca and Cerveteri; cf. Cl. Rolley, 'Le problème de l'art laconien', *Ktema* 2 (1977), 125–40, at pp. 134 f.; Stibbe, 'Neue Fragmente lakonischer Schalen aus Cerveteri', *Med. Ned. Inst. Rome* 38 (1976), 7–16.

a dozen or so served as grave-goods, indicating perhaps a more personal relation between pot and owner.⁴⁹ The imported Lakonian ware had an influence on Samian potters and painters; conversely, the East Greek influence detectable in Lakonian pottery and other artefacts could have emanated from or through Samos.⁵⁰ But such artistic cross-currents tell us nothing by themselves about interstate relations. The real historical question is this: how should the significance of the apparent concentration of Lakonian decorated pottery on Samos between c. 580 and 525 be read?⁵¹

Arthur Lane, in his still fundamental study of Lakonian painted pottery, expressed the following view: 'The extraordinarily high proportion of Lakonian vases from Samos, far outnumbering the commoner and more easily obtainable Corinthian [obtainable down to c. 550 – P. C.], points to a relationship between her and Sparta which cannot be explained on purely commercial grounds. The fashion for things Lakonian almost amounted to a cult. Racial affinities were out of the question; the true basis of the connection was probably to be found in the admiration which the Samian aristocracy felt for the Spartan *πολιτεία*'.⁵² Lane did not postulate a political affinity on the evidence of imported Lakonian pottery alone, but, in so far as pottery provides his main evidence, his hypothesis is highly vulnerable on several counts.

An importation of perhaps 200 Lakonian pots over a period of some two centuries is hardly enormous; and even though most of these imports were concentrated into a half-century or so, that is still no reason to postulate any other than a commercial explanation for at least the great majority of them.⁵³ The number of Lakonian pots finding their way outside Lakonia both east and west increases dramatically between c. 610 and 580.⁵⁴ Thereafter the wide distribution of Lakonian black figure, especially of kylikes suitable for the upper-class *symposion*, points to a determined orientation

⁴⁹ *Heraion*: Stibbe, *LV*, Nos 2, 3, 10, 14, 18, 21, 22 (?), 24, 25a, 25b, 26, 30, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 48, 49, 50, 52, 55, 57, 58, 59, 65, 75, 78, 79, 82, 85, 86, 89, 90, 91, 92, 102, 111, 118a–c, 119, 120, 123, 126, 127, 128, 129, 134 (?), 136, 138, 139, 142, 144, 145, 158a–b, 160 (?), 163, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 203, 206b (?), 207, 211, 212, 213, 215, 216, 230, 240, 246, 247, 252, 254, 265, 269, 279, 292 (?), 293, 295, 305, 315, 317, 321, 323, 327, 344, 360. Add now Stibbe, 'Ein lakonischer Becher aus dem Heraion von Samos', *AM* 91 (1976), 63–74; id., 'Lakonische Kantharoi', *Med. Ned. Inst. Rome* 40 (1978), 23 f., 36, Nos 1–2 (seven cups of unique form, all exported, two of which are from the Heraion); H. P. Isler, *Samos IV. Das Archaische Nordtor und seine Umgebung im Heraion von Samos* (Bonn, 1978), pp. 102 f., 166 f. (fragments of eight kylikes, and of one aryballos, krater and lakaina). *West Cemetery*: Stibbe, *LV*, Nos 106, 209, 210, 336. *Kyriakou* (grave): 294. *Misokampos* (heroön?): 206a, 206b (?).

⁵⁰ K. Schefold, *Meisterwerke gr. Kunst* (Basel & Stuttgart, 1960), pp. 24, 163 (3. 151–2), neatly juxtaposes a Lakonian kylix of unknown provenance (Stibbe No. 348) with a Samian imitation; cf. E. A. Lane, 'Lakonian vase-painting', *BSA* 34 (1933–4), 99–189, at p. 185; E. Walter-Karydi, *Samos VI.1. Samische Gefässe des 6. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Bonn, 1973), pp. 26, 28, 32, 37, 42, 43 f. For East Greek influence on Lakonia see Lane, art. cit., 131; further references in Walter-Karydi, op. cit., p. 26 and n. 64; add J. Boardman, *Greek Sculpture: the Archaic Period* (London, 1978), pp. 25 f. (perirrhanteria). See further n. 56.

⁵¹ I say 'apparent concentration' since, as Professor Cook reminds me, Samos *may* not prove unique among East Greek cities in its imports of Lakonian pottery; comparable sites elsewhere have either not been excavated or not been fully published. On balance, though, I rather suspect that Samos will hold its place in this regard.

⁵² Lane (n. 50), 179.

⁵³ Conceivably some or all of the pots which served as grave-goods (n. 49) had come into the possession of the families concerned through non-commercial means. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that most of the vases dedicated to Hera were not bought fairly cheaply from a retailer in Samos, possibly indeed within the Heraion itself, where *κάπηλοι* were operating at least by the second half of the third century B.C.: Chr. Habicht, *AM* 87 (1972, publ. 1974), 210–25; cf. Dunst, *ZPE* 18 (1975), 171–7; L. Koenen, *ZPE* 27 (1977), 211–16.

⁵⁴ Stibbe (n. 5), 14; the vases in question are conveniently grouped by shape in *LV*, pp. 15 f.

of production towards the export market.⁵⁵ The concentration of finds on Samos could be explained by the existence of a direct trade-route between Lakonia and Samos, which had perhaps come into being in the late eighth or early seventh century;⁵⁶ also relevant is the suggestion of Roebuck that Samos served as a point of collection and distribution for the Lakonian vases that have been found in the east Mediterranean area from Pergamon to Rhodes.⁵⁷ Finally, it may be added that the purchasing of Lakonian pottery is not an obvious way of demonstrating sympathy for Sparta's political system; here Lane's hypothesis teeters precariously on the brink of endorsing the erroneous modernizing view that Archaic Greek states, and not just individual citizens or aliens resident therein, took an interest in the manufacture and distribution of painted pottery.

However, even though there is no call to postulate a political connection to explain the concentration of Lakonian pottery imports on the island in the sixth century, the question remains how and why the trading-channel between Sparta and Samos (using those terms strictly geographically) became established in the first place. There seem to me two main possibilities. One is that Samian merchants (or merchants trading to Samos) were already active in the western trade from the early seventh century and put in for shelter, provisions or trade at Gytheion or some other Lakonian port.⁵⁸ The other main possibility is that it was personal contacts between Spartan and Samian aristocrats which motivated the trading connection, for example by stimulating the demand for the eastern luxuries of which Jeffery has written. The help that Herodotus' 'Samians' alleged their ancestors had given to Sparta against the Messenians cannot be independently corroborated, but the report is at least not contradicted by the archaeological evidence for connections between Sparta and Samos. If it is a true report, it suggests that personal contacts between Spartan and Samian aristocrats had been established by the mid-seventh century.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ G. Vallet & F. Villard, 'Céramique grecque et histoire économique', in P. Courbin (ed.), *Études archéologiques* (Paris, 1963), pp. 205–17, at 209. But there were very few Spartan workshops: Stibbe has identified just fourteen distinct artistic personalities in the sixth century, five of whom have identifiable followers.

⁵⁶ In his still fundamental article R. M. Cook argued that the export in considerable quantities of Greek pottery of a minor school such as Lakonian would be evidence of direct trade between the place of finding and the home of that school: 'Die Bedeutung der bemalten Keramik für den gr. Handel', *Jdl* 74 (1959), 114–23, at pp. 117, 123. He has since abandoned that hypothesis in this particular case and suggested instead that Samian traders were active in the western trade and stopped off in Lakonia for one reason or another on the return journey: 'The distribution of Laconian pottery', *JHS* 99 (1979), 153 f. I prefer his earlier view, which may be corroborated by Sparta's strong eastern contacts from the early seventh century. As Jeffery (n. 27), p. 217, has suggested, 'Samos may have been one (if not the only) channel whereby the luxuries of the east Aegean and Lydia had come to Lakonia'. For Samos as a recipient of *orientalia* see U. Jantzen, *Samos VIII. Aegyptische und orientalische Bronzen aus dem Heraion von Samos* (Bonn, 1972), with the reviews in *AJA* 77 (1973), 236 f.; *Gnomon* 47 (1975), 392–402.

⁵⁷ C. Roebuck, *Ionian Trade and Colonization* (New York, 1959), pp. 82 f.; though I cannot accept without qualification his view that 'This export to Samos is usually and reasonably accounted for by the political connections between the two states'.

⁵⁸ For Lakonian harbours, of which the principal one was Gytheion, see my *Sparta and Lakonia*, pp. 143, 181 f. There is no question that Lakonian (Perioikic) traders could have inaugurated the connection; but then there is virtually no evidence for Lakonian traders at any period. For the few (and not diagnostic) trademarks on Lakonian pots see A. W. Johnston, 'Trademarks on Greek vases', *GR* 21 (1974), 138–52, at p. 141; 'Rhodian readings', *BSA* 70 (1975), 145–67, at p. 148 and n. 7; *Trademarks on Greek Vases* (Warminster, 1979), pp. 19, 51, 172, 235.

⁵⁹ cf. S. C. Humphreys, *Anthropology and the Greeks* (London, 1978), p. 160: 'Earlier [sc. than the fifth century] a more complicated interaction can be traced between the travels and

It is not possible, then, to say with certainty how the channel of direct commercial communication between Sparta and Samos became established. But it is possible to document, epigraphically as well as archaeologically, personal aristocratic contacts in the Archaic period. For the other Archaic Lakonian finds on Samos apart from the black figure and plain pottery cannot be given a purely commercial explanation; this far I am prepared to go with Lane. These other finds include between two and four carved ivories;⁶⁰ a bronze couchant lion, probably originally part of a large bronze vessel;⁶¹ a bronze figurine of a hoplite, one of only two of this class found outside the Greek mainland;⁶² a bronze mirror-handle in the shape of a draped girl or young woman;⁶³ and a mouldmade terracotta protome.⁶⁴ All these articles were dedicated in the Samian Heraion between c. 650 and 525, and all except the last are either specially commissioned items or at least *articles de luxe*. They are thus in principle unlikely to – and in one case certainly did not – form part of a regular commerce; though the existence of a direct trade-route would of course have facilitated their carriage. They are, rather, the kind of *objets* that a Samian aristocrat might have received from his host on a visit to Sparta, perhaps for the Gymnopaïdai festival, or that a Spartan aristocrat might have dedicated to Hera while visiting his Samian *xenos*.⁶⁵ We recall Solon's apt comment on such lucky men (*supra*, p. 250).

Happily, we are not reduced entirely to mere surmise. For the couchant lion carries, incised around his rather comical mane, the following informative message: 'Eumnastos, a Spartiate, to Hera'. Eumnastos describes himself as a Spartiate, a full

guest-friendships of nobles, war, raiding and piracy, and the development of trade.' See further section V.

⁶⁰ The two certainly Lakonian ivories are B. Freyer-Schauenburg, *Elfenbeine aus dem samischen Heraion* (Hamburg, 1966), pp. 4 f., Nos 5 and 6 (E.1, E.78), pp. 30–9, pls. 6a, 8a; cf. E.-L. I. Marangou, *Lakonische Elfenbein- und Beinschnitzereien* (Tübingen, 1969), pp. 74 ff. and n. 434; 196 f. Marangou, *ibid.*, pp. 42, 139, 196 and nn. 231–2, is inclined to follow a suggestion of H.-V. Herrmann in assigning to Lakonia the famous kneeling youth who probably served as a lyre-support (Freyer-Schauenburg E.88); but this suggestion was always rather implausible: cf. Boardman (n. 50), fig. 53. Better is her suggestion (*op. cit.*, p. 197 and n. 1114) that her fig. 58 (Freyer-Schauenburg E.10) is Lakonian.

⁶¹ H. Gabelmann, *Studien zum frühgr. Löwenbild* (Berlin, 1965), pp. 69–71, 117, No. 69a; Dunst (n. 20), 140–4, fig. 6, pl. 56; Snodgrass (n. 26), p. 133 and pl. 20.

⁶² Vathy Mus. B 302: *JHS* 53 (1933), 286, 289, fig. 15; J. Ducat, *Les Kouroi du Ptoion* (Paris, 1971), p. 344, (f); M. Jost, 'Statuettes de bronze archaïques provenant de Lykosura', *BCH* 99 (1975), 359, No. 15. Attribution of such figurines to Lakonia is always uncertain, though fairly secure here; but certainly false is the view of B. Segall, *AJA* 59 (1955), 316, that they were designed for export as 'symbols of Sparta's military strength' and tokens of Spartan opposition to Persian expansion. The example found far beyond the Greek world in South Arabia, which prompted Segall's fantasy, could be a traveller's or native trader's curio: Boardman, *Greeks Overseas*, p. 18.

⁶³ E. Buschor, *Altsamische Standbilder 1* (Berlin, 1934), pp. 132 f., figs. 115–17; cf. Dunst (n. 20), 142. This was only tentatively attributed to Lakonia by E. Kunze, *AM* 59 (1934), 99 (not cited by Dunst), but the attribution carries considerable weight in the light of the intimate familiarity with Lakonian art-forms he displayed in *Gnomon* 9 (1933), 1–14 (a review of *Artemis Orthia*: see next note). It is not, however, cited in the important discussion of this class of mirror-handles by Th. Karagiorga, *ADelt* 20A (1965), 96–109.

⁶⁴ Rightly attributed by H. Kyrieleis, *AA* 1978, 395 f., fig. 14, comparing R. M. Dawkins (ed.), *Artemis Orthia* (*JHS* Supp. V, 1929), pls. 29. 2, 3, 7; 38. 3; and R. J. H. Jenkins, *Dedolica* (Cambridge, 1936), pl. 5. 4–5.

⁶⁵ The Gymnopaïdai were founded traditionally in 668: H. T. Wade-Gery, 'A note on the origin of the Spartan Gymnopaïdai', *CQ* 43 (1949), 79–81. For the attendance of distinguished foreign guests see Xen. *Mem.* 1. 2. 61; Plut. *Cim.* 10. 6; *Mor.* 823e. For the luxury of the Archaic Samians, displayed actually in the Heraion, see Asios (a Samian contemporary) fr. 13 Diehl, translated in C. J. Emlyn-Jones, *The Ionians and Hellenism* (London, 1980), p. 20.

member of the Spartan citizen-body, and not merely as a 'Lakedaimonios' or member of the Spartan state in the wider sense, to make plain his political status.⁶⁶ That he was a wealthy man is implicit in the expense both of the offering itself and of the travel needed to dedicate it in far-away Samos.⁶⁷ Finally, the date of his offering, as revealed both by the style of the lion and by the Lakonian letter-forms of the inscription, is around 550 – a generation or so, that is, before the extrusion of the Samian aristocrats by Polykrates and their appeal to Sparta. Why, then, to return to our original question, did the Spartans agree to help restore the Samian aristocratic exiles in 525?

V

At Herodotus 3. 47, his 'Spartans' gave revenge for two blatant acts of Samian piracy as their ancestors' motive for undertaking the expedition. Even if this be regarded as an *αἰτία ἐς τὸ φάνερρον λεγομένη* rather than as the *ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις*, it cannot simply be rejected out of hand as 'frivolous', as it was by Lane.⁶⁸ The Samians were notoriously addicted to piracy, public and official as well as private;⁶⁹ the items intercepted were intrinsically precious and had an even higher 'sentimental' value as diplomatic presents; and revenge was not only as sweet then as it is supposed to be now (e.g. Thuc. 7. 68. 1) but also carried with it positive moral obligations.⁷⁰ But although I do believe revenge to have been a necessary cause, even I would not go so far as to consider it a sufficient one. It is therefore requisite to look, briefly, at the three main modern suggestions.⁷¹ These are: fear of Persian expansion;⁷² principled

⁶⁶ This is one of only two epigraphical uses of *Σπαρτιάτης* as opposed to *Λακεδαιμόνιος* known to me; the other is a perhaps rather earlier dedication at Olympia by τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις collectively. On the other hand, two Spartan *proxenoi* of Elis, who were granted the signal honour of inscribed marble seats at Olympia in the second half of the sixth century, both had themselves described as *Λακεδαιμόνιος*. References in my 'Literacy in the Spartan oligarchy', *JHS* 98 (1978), 36 n. 76.

⁶⁷ The suggestion in Herodotus (8. 132. 3) that Samos still seemed remote even in 479 is a dramatic exaggeration, probably due to the impatience of Herodotus' Ionian source with Latychidas' caution, rather than a reflection of early-fifth-century reality. Still, for Eumnastos Samos may have seemed distant indeed, and conceivably, as Professor Barron has suggested to me, his visit to Samos was connected with the diplomatic dealings between Sparta and Croesus (text and n. 75). For Samos as a stop-over en route from the Peloponnese to Sardis in the sixth century see Hdt. 3. 48. 2.

⁶⁸ Lane (n. 50), 179.

⁶⁹ H. A. Ormerod, *Piracy in the Ancient World* (Liverpool, 1924; repr. 1978), pp. 200–5; cf. Y. Garlan, 'Signification historique de la piraterie grecque', *Dialogues d'histoire ancienne* iv (Besançon & Paris, 1978), pp. 1–16, esp. 2–5 (Samian piracy would correspond most nearly to his Type 3).

⁷⁰ See generally K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality* (Oxford, 1974), pp. 181–4. Acceptance of the truth of this alleged motive of revenge would seem to have one historically important corollary, namely that a connection of the famous Polykrates had been tyrant before him. For powerful statements of this view see M. E. White, 'The duration of the Samian tyranny' *JHS* 74 (1954), 36–43; J. P. Barron, 'The sixth-century tyranny at Samos', *CQ* n.s. 14 (1964), 210–29, esp. pp. 212 f. Recent literature on the duration and personnel of the Samian tyranny is reviewed by G. Schmidt, 'Heraion von Samos: eine Brychon-Weihe', *AM* 87 (1972, publ. 1974), 165–85, at pp. 181–5 (revised stemma of Polykrates on p. 166).

⁷¹ A fourth suggested explanation brings Sparta and Corinth to Samos in 524 because Polykrates' coup had deprived them of good Samian trade-contacts; but this seems to me to misprize the character of Archaic Greek trade.

⁷² A brief bibliography is given by M. M. Austin, *Greece and Egypt in the Archaic Age* (PCPhS Supp. II, 1970), pp. 74 f.; cf. Lewis (n. 28), p. 62 n. 81, where he expresses 'some fondness' for 'an old-fashioned view that some Spartans had the Persian threat well in mind even before 491'.

hostility to tyranny;⁷³ and a desire to extend their hegemony from the land (i.e. the Peloponnese) to the sea.⁷⁴

The evidence for the first is ambiguous. On the one hand, Sparta did reportedly conclude an alliance with Croesus of Lydia on an explicitly anti-Persian basis; and, though failing in the event to send the help promised to Croesus, Sparta ostentatiously posed as the champion of Hellenism against the rising tide of oriental despotism in the 540s.⁷⁵ On the other hand, Sparta in fact did nothing unambiguously to resist Persian encroachment westwards until the late 490s; and even then, it seems clear, Sparta's decision to act was taken largely on the personal initiative of King Kleomenes, who had twice before (c. 517 and c. 500) forgone opportunities to intervene militarily on the other side of the Aegean.⁷⁶

The evidence for Sparta's principled opposition to tyranny also cuts two ways. Sparta itself never experienced a tyranny at home and, according to a tradition attested in Herodotus (5. 92a. 2) and Aristotle (*Pol.* 5. 10, 1312 b 8–10) but most fully expressed by Plutarch (*Mor.* 859b–d), took pride in having terminated tyrannies not only in the Peloponnese but also as far afield as Naxos.⁷⁷ Against this, however, must be set the facts that down to c. 510 Sparta was on good terms with the Peisistratid tyrants of Athens, that in c. 506 Kleomenes aimed to install Isagoras as tyrant of Athens and that in c. 504 Sparta proposed to its Peloponnesian League allies that they should collaborate in restoring Hippias, again as tyrant of Athens.⁷⁸ This attitude towards Athens may be the exception that proves the rule, but the rule remains to be demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt, especially in the light of Sparta's later and merited reputation for opportunism in international relations (e.g. Thuc. 5. 105. 4).

The third main modern rival to Herodotus, the view that in deposing Polykrates and restoring the Samian aristocracy Sparta aimed to extend its hegemony from the Peloponnese to the Aegean, cannot in the very nature of things be proved, since the expedition failed. Conceivably, though, in this expedition and in Kleomenes' subsequent refusals to become involved militarily in transmarine operations we have the first evidence for that extraordinary oscillation between adventurism and 'Little Peloponnesian' isolationism which characterizes Spartan foreign policy throughout the fifth century and into the fourth.⁷⁹ The trouble is that, thanks to Herodotus or

⁷³ H. Berve, *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen* (Munich, 1967), I, p. 113; II, pp. 586 f.

⁷⁴ J. Hasebroek, *Gr. Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte bis zur Perserzeit* (Tübingen, 1931), p. 224; cf. G. L. Cawkwell, 'Agesilaus and Sparta', *CQ.* n.s. 26 (1976), 66–84, at p. 71 (the most satisfactory account of the origins of the Peloponnesian League is 'that which grounds the extension of Spartan influence in a policy of suppressing tyrannies and restoring exiled aristocracies with which she entered into agreements of friendship and mutual defence'); R. P. Legon, *Megara. The political history of a Greek city-state to 336 B.C.* (Ithaca & London, 1981), pp. 141–2.

⁷⁵ Alliance: Bengtson, *Svt.* 113; though this has been doubted, e.g. by Austin (n. 72). Champion of Hellenism: Hdt. I. 152–3, esp. 152. 3; cf. 5. 49. 2.

⁷⁶ Kleomenes' intervention at Aigina: Hdt. 6. 48–51, 61. 1, 64–67. 1, 73; cf. my *Sparta and Lakonia*, pp. 150 f. Kleomenes' refusals: Hdt. 3. 148 (Maiandrios), with V. La Bua, 'Sulla conquista persiana di Samo', *Quarta miscellanea greca e romana* (Rome, 1975), 41–102, esp. pp. 88 ff.; and 5. 49–51 (Aristagoras). Incidentally, Herodotus' justification (3. 60. 1) for the length of his digression on Polykrates suggests that he did not regard the Spartan expedition of 524 as an integral part of his story of Graeco-Persian hostilities.

⁷⁷ For the view that the Spartans deposed Lygdamis of Naxos in the mid-520s and not later see D. M. Leahy, 'The Spartan embassy to Lygdamis', *JHS* 77 (1957), 272–5.

⁷⁸ *Sparta and Lakonia*, pp. 146 f., 148.

⁷⁹ G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972), ch. 4, esp. pp. 151–66.

his sources, we do not know how Sparta made decisions of foreign policy in the second half of the sixth century.

Carlier, in a sensitive and nuanced treatment of this aspect of Kleomenes' reign (c. 520–491), has argued cogently that already by then it was the Spartan assembly which took the decisive vote, but that the kings might inspire and direct foreign policy and that it was certainly they who as a rule executed it, jointly down to c. 506, singly (in warfare at least) thereafter.⁸⁰ It is therefore remarkable that neither of the kings reigning in 525–4 (Anaxandridas II and Ariston) is given any rôle whatsoever in Herodotus' account of the Samian affair. It can only be suggested tentatively that Herodotus' noncommittal expression *ἄρχοντες* (3. 46. 1) includes certainly the two kings, possibly the other twenty-eight members of the Gerousia, and probably the five Ephors.⁸¹ It is also possible that in the interval between the two representations by the Samian exiles the *archontes* put the matter before the Spartan assembly and secured a vote in favour of the expedition.⁸² Indeed, it may have been in this interval that the 'eagerness' of the Corinthians was made known in Sparta and so perhaps swayed the assembly's vote. For, whether or not the two states were (as I believe they were) formally allied by 525, Sparta would inescapably require Corinth's ships to mount an expedition of any size against Polykrates, and we are told (Hdt. 3. 54. 1) that the expedition was in fact a large one.⁸³

Whatever the merits of these unsupported guesses, one further factor possibly influencing the Spartans' decision remains to be canvassed. As far as I am aware, no modern commentator has paid much serious attention to the motive alleged by Herodotus' 'Samians'; Lane, for example, cavalierly dismissed it as 'romantic and based on a questionable legend'.⁸⁴ According to this 'legend', the Samians had helped the Spartans against the Messenians at some unspecified earlier date. The reference is clearly to one of the 'Messenian Wars' of conquest conducted by Sparta at various times between c. 735 and 600. Since the fighting in the first war (c. 735–715) was confined to the land (and perhaps restricted to the Stenyklaros plain in the upper Pamisos valley) and antedated the hoplite reform, any help given by the Samians would have had to be provided by a handful of aristocratic champions and perhaps their immediate followers.⁸⁵ It is possible that this is what Herodotus' 'Samians' had in mind, though for what it is worth archaeology does not provide unambiguous evidence for a connection between Sparta and Samos until some decades after the First Messenian War.⁸⁶ Far more plausible, however, is the view shared by most modern

⁸⁰ P. Carlier, 'La vie politique à Sparte sous le règne de Cléomène Ier: essai d'interprétation', *Ktema* 2 (1977), 65–84. He rightly emphasizes that in order to understand 'the interior evolution of Spartan political life' we must begin from Herodotus' account of Kleomenes' reign (biased though it is) rather than fit that account into any preconceived schema derived from an interpretation of the later evidence.

⁸¹ That the term includes all these was the view of G. Niccolini, 'I re e gli efori a Sparta', *RSA* n.s. 5 (1900), 524–51, at p. 542.

⁸² Herodotus' silence cannot be taken as a decisive argument for the unimportance or non-intervention of the Gerousia and the procedure of *probouleusis*.

⁸³ Will (n. 21), pp. 635 f., who adds as a further possible consideration the geopolitical situation in the Peloponnese. In a forthcoming history of Corinth, John Salmon plausibly argues that Sparta and Corinth had concluded an alliance in c. 550, though I cannot entirely accept his version of the terms of this alliance.

⁸⁴ Lane (n. 50), 179.

⁸⁵ For the view, which I cannot accept, that Samian involvement in the First Messenian War was part of a far-flung, almost panhellenic 'Lelantine War' see W. G. Forrest, *A History of Sparta 950–192* (London, 1968, 1980), p. 36.

⁸⁶ Vathy Mus. B 1080, a team of bronze horse-figurines datable to the second half of the eighth century, does show Lakonian stylistic traits, but cannot be certainly attributed to Lakonia: H.-V. Herrmann, 'Werkstätte geometrischer Bronzeplastik', *Jdl* 79 (1964), 17–71, at p. 22 n.

historians, that Samian help would have been much more useful to Sparta in the seventh-century war(s).⁸⁷ For control of the coastal towns of Messenia must surely have entailed naval as well as land-based warfare, and there is some evidence that the Samians, as we might have expected from a prosperous island people, took an early interest in progressive ship design.⁸⁸ Besides, from at latest c. 650 on, a connection of some kind between Sparta and Samos is archaeologically demonstrable. Supposing, then, that it was to help given in the seventh century that Herodotus' 'Samians' were referring, what form might that help have taken? Given the expense of fitting out a warship, it would clearly again have been the landholding aristocracy of the Geomoroi who, individually or collectively, gave the military aid.⁸⁹

In short, Samian help, if any, is far more likely to have been forthcoming in the seventh than in the eighth century, and there seems to me no intrinsic reason why the alleged help should be rejected without further ado as a historical fiction. But whether it was given in the eighth century or the seventh, this assistance would have been provided by the ancestors of the men appealing for Spartan aid in 525. The question therefore, finally, is whether there are grounds for believing that the Spartans would have been moved in 525 by an appeal to reciprocate a previous favour, as Samian aristocrats in c. 450 found it plausible to believe and to suggest to Herodotus that they were.

There are indeed such grounds. The Spartans were notoriously conservative in their expressed ideology and prone to overvalue the past, so an appeal to obligating precedent might well have struck a chord.⁹⁰ This was especially likely to happen if, as I have tried to show, ties of *xenia* between Spartan and Samian aristocrats amounting to a special relationship between the two states existed in 525. It may perhaps be objected that, on this view, Herodotus' Spartans ought to have endorsed the motive alleged by his 'Samians'. But Herodotus was merely retailing the motives his Spartan informant(s) believed to have been decisive in 525; and his or their views will have been coloured, certainly by knowledge of the expedition's failure and (in the case of Archias II) by family tradition, and perhaps also by the state of international relations in the Aegean in the third quarter of the fifth century.

So although broader geopolitical and ideological considerations may have been far from unimportant to the Spartans' decision, the personal relationships between leading Spartans and members of the Samian landholding aristocracy could have helped to tip the balance in favour of an undertaking without precedent or parallel in Archaic Spartan history – what Herodotus (3. 56. 2) slightly inaccurately called 'the first expedition to Asia by Lakedaimonian Dorians'.⁹¹

19; W.-D. Heilmeyer, *Olympische Forschungen XII. Frühe Olympische Bronzefiguren. Die Tiervotive* (Berlin, 1979), 111 and n. 157.

⁸⁷ See e.g. F. Kiechle, *Messenische Studien* (Kallmünz, 1959), p. 33; G. L. Huxley, *Early Sparta* (London, 1962), p. 74; Jeffery (n. 27), p. 120.

⁸⁸ Thuc. 1. 13. 3. The precise type of the ships designed for the Samians by the Corinthian Ameinokles is disputed, but this is of course irrelevant for my purposes.

⁸⁹ cf. Plut. *Quaest. Graec.* 57 (a fleet sent out by the Geomoroi apparently early in the sixth century). Humphreys (n. 59), p. 166, speaks of 'the ships which Greek aristocrats owned and used in war, diplomacy, visits to religious festivals and games, and travels abroad to contract or keep up personal alliances, – especially when in exile, a not infrequent phenomenon in the archaic age'.

⁹⁰ On the Spartans and their past see O. Murray, *Early Greece* (London, 1980), p. 153. But compare, e.g., the formally parallel motive for Eretria's participation in the Ionian Revolt: Hdt. 5. 99. 1.

⁹¹ Only slightly inaccurately since, though Samos was not geographically part of Asia, the island was under Persian suzerainty in 524, and the Great King habitually equated his domain with 'Asia' (e.g. Hdt. 1. 4).

VI

After the Greek victory over the Persians at Mykale on the Anatolian mainland opposite Samos in 479, the Geomoroi or some of them resumed the political helm at Samos.⁹² The new rulers presumably included the three aristocratic Samians who had successfully appealed to King Latychidas of Sparta before Mykale.⁹³ It was the views of such men and their immediate descendants that Herodotus was reflecting in his unusually long treatment of Samian history down to 479.

In the light of their often bitter personal experience over the previous half-century the members of this régime were unsurprisingly hostile from the start to both tyranny and medism. In time, and for similar reasons, their successors were to manifest a no less virulent antipathy towards democracy. The vicissitudes of Samian politics from 479 to 404 cannot be traced in detail here; and the sources – numismatic as well as literary and epigraphical – do not in any case permit such a history to be written. But two episodes of this period, in which Samian domestic antagonisms again provoked Spartan involvement, require closer examination. As with the events of 525–4, I propose to consider whether a special relationship between Sparta and Samos was also a material factor in these episodes of the Classical age.

The first episode is the relatively well attested Samian revolt of 440–39. In 478/7 the Samians had joined the anti-Persian 'Delian League', just as in 479 they had successfully applied to join the 'Hellenic League', with enthusiasm.⁹⁴ Their contribution to the alliance was made in ships rather than cash, and presumably (in the absence of evidence either way) they fulfilled their naval obligations loyally in the first two decades of the League's existence. Perhaps too they contributed to the ultimately disastrous Egyptian expedition of 459–4;⁹⁵ and, if we can believe Plutarch (*Arist.* 25. 2–3), it was they who proposed the transfer of the League treasury from Delos to Athens in 454.⁹⁶ Since the Samians continued to contribute ships thereafter, they do not appear in the tribute-quota lists; but epigraphical evidence for their ensuing loyalty to Athens has been seen in a series of *horoi* marking reservations for Athena Ἀθηνῶν μεδέουσα (Queen of Athens), which should be datable before 445.⁹⁷

How is this persistent loyalty to be explained, when other important ship-contributing island states like Naxos and Thasos had revolted from Athens in the 460s and when there was apparent disaffection in the Kyklades and Asia Minor after 454? The answer must lie in the overriding antipathy towards Persia of the Samian governing class and

⁹² I assume that the Greek victory at Mykale spelled the end of the tyranny of Theomestor (Hdt. 8. 85. 3; cf. 130). But in this instance I cannot follow Kraay (n. 38), p. 333, in his suggested political interpretation of the alternation between square and round reverse dies on the fifth-century Samian coinage, for this would make Samos a democracy between c. 480 and 475. See also n. 98.

⁹³ Hdt. 9. 90, discussed by Mitchell (n. 9), 90; cf. 76 n. 12. It is perhaps noteworthy that an earlier appeal by Chians had elicited only a lukewarm response from Latychidas.

⁹⁴ R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford, 1972), pp. 33 f., 43, 413 f. [hereafter Meiggs]. 'Delian League' is of course a modern term, and it would not be inappropriate to refer to the organization as 'the Athenian Empire' within a few years of its foundation.

⁹⁵ M/L 34 = C. W. Fornara (ed.), *Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War* (Baltimore & London, 1977), No. 77 [hereafter Fornara]. The date of this epigram is uncertain. See also the inscription recording the award of an *aristeion* to the Samian Leokritos by Inaros, king of the Libyans: Dunst (n. 20), 153–5.

⁹⁶ Plutarch gives Theophrastos as his source, but as it stands the anecdote can hardly be attached to 454, since by then Aristides was dead; it may be wholly spurious.

⁹⁷ Barron, 'Religious propaganda of the Delian League', *JHS* 84 (1964), 35–48; cf. Meiggs, pp. 295–8.

their wish to avoid the mistake made by other oligarchies in the League of giving Athens a pretext to overthrow them.⁹⁸ But in 441 they did invite Athenian intervention by initiating hostilities with their old rivals and fellow-members of the Delian League, the Milesians.⁹⁹ The immediate circumstances of the dispute are unclear, but two preconditions of the Samian aggression can be inferred with some confidence. First, the Persian threat had visibly receded from the early 440s, as is symbolized by the termination of warfare between the Delian League as such and the Great King.¹⁰⁰ Secondly, at some time before 442 oligarchic Miletos had experienced *stasis*, Athenian intervention and the establishment of a democracy.¹⁰¹ Thus by 441 the Samian oligarchy might have felt itself both freer to pursue its own interests at the expense of Miletos and at the same time increasingly threatened by the inevitable domestic repercussions of an Athenian-supported democratic revolution so near at hand.

Faced by Samian aggression, the Milesians appealed naturally to Athens. When the Samians persisted regardless, the Athenians under Perikles 'sailed with forty ships to Samos, imposed a democratic government, took hostages from the oligarchs, sent them for safe keeping to Lemnos, and installed a small Athenian garrison with officers combining military and political duties'.¹⁰² This was meat and drink to the Samian oligarchs, some of whom will have been born and bred in and to the rigours of exile in Samos' mainland possession of Anaia. Sacrificing their anti-Persian to their anti-democratic principles, they secured a force of 700 mercenaries from the local Persian satrap, freed the hostages on Lemnos and reinstated themselves in Samos. Then they renewed hostilities with Miletos, only this time in an open revolt from Athens and the Delian League, in which they were joined – for reasons that are opaque – by Byzantion.¹⁰³

The gravity of this situation could not escape Athens. Byzantion controlled the Bosphoros bottleneck through which passed Athens' vital Black Sea grain-supply. Samos was a strategically pivotal naval base: later it could be alleged that the Samian revolt had actually jeopardized Athens' control of the sea (Thuc. 8. 76. 4). The support of the Persian satrap, whether or not he was taking a line independent of Susa, raised again the Persian bogey the Athenians were proudly claiming to have laid to rest. Finally – and this is the main point of the incident for present purposes – the Samian

⁹⁸ For the view that Samos remained an oligarchy from 479 to 441 see Ed. Will, 'Notes sur les régimes politiques de Samos au V^e siècle', *REA* 71 (1969), 305–19, at pp. 308–12; R. P. Legon, 'Samos in the Delian League', *Historia* 21 (1972), 145–58. I am not competent to assess the numismatic part of Barron, *The Silver Coins of Samos* (London, 1966), pp. 80–93, who argues that Samos was a democracy between 494 and 454, an oligarchy from 453 to 439, and a democracy 439–12; but see Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins*, pp. 241, 332–4, for some counter-suggestions. On the other hand, I find it hard on historical grounds to believe in Kraay's own numismatically based reconstruction of governmental shifts; cf. n. 92.

⁹⁹ For the chronology see now Fornara, *JHS* 99 (1979), 7–18; on Samian aggression, Meiggs, p. 428.

¹⁰⁰ I am prepared to believe in a 'Peace of Kallias' concluded in the early 440s, but even if no such formal peace was made my argument would not be affected.

¹⁰¹ Meiggs, pp. 188, 562–5; H.-J. Gerke, 'Zur Geschichte Milets in der Mitte des 5. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.', *Historia* 29 (1980), 17–31.

¹⁰² Meiggs, p. 189.

¹⁰³ The course of the revolt is described by D. Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, 1969), pp. 170–8; and Meiggs, pp. 188–94; the latter, rightly in my view, accepts the *prima facie* suspect evidence of Douris (76F67) concerning the brutality of Athens' punishment of the captured Samian trierarchs and marines. For the hostages see M. Amit, 'Hostages in ancient Greece', *RFC* 98 (1970), 129–47, at p. 140. To account for the participation of Byzantion, Legon (n. 74), pp. 201 f., has tentatively suggested a connection between the revolt of Megara's chief colony and Megarian–Athenian hostility.

revolt called into question the whole military and diplomatic balance of the Aegean Greek world.

In 446/5 Athens and its allies had concluded a Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta and its allies. The peace – or at least its terms and the manner of its conclusion – had not been universally popular in Sparta, and King Pleistoanax and his adviser had been forced into exile in consequence.¹⁰⁴ Now only four years later, in 441/0, the question of the peace was on the agenda again, not only of the Spartan assembly but also of the Peloponnesian League. How had it found its way there? The answer depends overwhelmingly on interpretation of Thucydides, specifically of the speech he wrote for the Corinthians in the Kerkyra debate of 433 at Athens (1. 37–43, esp. 40. 5, 41. 2, 43. 1) and of his account of the procedure whereby Sparta and the Peloponnesian League decided in 432 that Athens had broken the terms of the Thirty Years' Peace (1. 67–68, 118–25).

According to the interpretation I accept, the responsibility for the calling of a Peloponnesian League Congress rested with Sparta alone, and the summoning of a Congress in peacetime would therefore imply a Spartan decision for war, its summoning in time of war a Spartan decision for peace.¹⁰⁵ If this is right, the calling of a League Congress in 441/0 to decide whether to help the Samian oligarchs in their revolt means that the Spartan assembly had already decided to do so. What arguments were laid before the Spartan assembly, who laid them and which of them proved decisive we shall never know, because Thucydides did not need to write a full-dress account of this debate as he did of the debate at Sparta in 432. But we do have, in fragmentary form, the Athenian decree of (probably) 440/39 laying down the terms of the settlement which followed the eventual reduction of Samos; and, as Meiggs has cautiously written, 'in a very fragmentary context near the opening of the decree the Peloponnesians may be mentioned, perhaps a reference to the Samian attempt to involve Sparta and her allies'.¹⁰⁶

This may seem a heavy burden of inference to place on just six surviving letters of the original decree, and caution is clearly in order. Yet it seems almost obligatory to assume that in the context of 441/0 the temporarily restored Samian oligarchs would have realized the need for more substantial aid than the Persian satrap was able to provide and that they would therefore have sent a delegation requesting help to the only other seriously possible source of it (apart from Byzantion), namely Sparta.¹⁰⁷ As in 525, the Samian oligarchs' appeal will have been addressed to the Spartan *archontes*, at least in the first instance; perhaps too a Samian delegation was then permitted to address the Spartan assembly, as was the Corinthian delegation in 432. If so, some of the arguments deployed may plausibly be conjectured from the speech written by Thucydides (3. 9–14) for 'the Mytilenaians', who in 428 were similarly rulers of a ship-contributing island oligarchy in revolt from Athens.

¹⁰⁴ The known terms of the peace are set out in Ste. Croix (n. 79), pp. 293 f. For the Spartan reaction see my *Sparta and Lakonia*, p. 230.

¹⁰⁵ A. H. M. Jones, 'Two synods of the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues', *PCPhS* 2 (1952/3), 43–6; Ste. Croix, *Origins*, pp. 117, 143, 220–3. Meiggs, p. 190 and n. 3, agrees that Sparta did call a League Congress but not that the Spartan assembly had already decided in favour of sending help. However, if we accept (as Meiggs does) that the language Thucydides puts into the mouth of 'the Corinthians' at 1. 40. 5 is precise, then clearly the motion on which the allies were asked to vote was a motion in favour of sending help. That motion must have been put to the Congress if not actually by Sparta at least with Spartan approval.

¹⁰⁶ Meiggs, p. 190. The decree is *IG* i² 50+ = M/L 56 = Fornara, No. 115. For what has been published as *IG* i³ 145, which may or may not be the beginning of the decree, see D. M. Lewis, 'Additional note' to Fornara (n. 99), 18 f.

¹⁰⁷ cf. Legon (n. 98), 151. Thuc. 1. 140. 2, where Perikles is made to say in 432 'It was evident before that the Spartans had designs on us', may also be relevant.

In one key respect, however, the situation of the Samian oligarchs materially differed from that of the Mytilenaian oligarchs: in 441/0 Athens and Sparta were at peace, and the peace treaty was only four years old. Thus the temporizing, anti-war arguments attributed by Thucydides (1. 80–5) to King Archidamos in 432 should have been more cogent in 441/0; and strong though the military, diplomatic and ideological enticements to intervene in the Samian revolt surely were, the Spartans then lacked even the flimsy legalistic garb in which they tried to dress up their formally unjustified decision for war in 432.¹⁰⁸ In short, some further factor above and beyond the immediate military, diplomatic and ideological considerations may legitimately be postulated to explain the Spartans' decision in 441/0. That transcendent factor, I suggest, could have been the special relationship between Sparta and Samos. For the expedition of 524 had been a failure; the ledger of reciprocal benefits still showed a balance in favour of the Samian aristocrats. Here, then, in 441/0 was what could have seemed a splendid chance for the Spartans to pay their debts – and destroy Athens as a great power into the bargain.¹⁰⁹

The second and final episode to be considered comprises the Samian events of the turbulent period from 412 to 404. In early January 439 (on Fornara's chronology) the Samian revolt had finally been crushed, and Athens had a free hand to impose terms. It is true that neither in the Athenian decree as preserved (n. 106) nor in Thucydides (1. 117) is there mention made in those terms of constitutional arrangements; but it seems to me virtually certain that Athens would have insisted on the establishment of a (grateful and dependent) democracy.¹¹⁰ We do not know whether the surviving members of the previous oligarchic régime were all expelled or prudently chose to leave Samos, but the exiles at Anaia mentioned by Thucydides (3. 19. 2, 32. 2; 4. 75. 1; cf. 8. 19. 2, 61. 2) presumably were or included Geomoroï and so Herodotus' Samian friends and their descendants.¹¹¹ Their long years in exile will not have improved their temper towards either the Samian *demos* or Athens, and they will not have been slow to seize the chance to reinstate themselves in the wake of Athens' Sicilian disaster. This, at any rate, is how I would explain the fact that they were once more in power by 412, when they were yet again overthrown, this time by an internal democratic uprising (Thuc. 8. 21. 1, quoted below). The context of the rising is surely provided by Diodorus (13. 34. 2), who says that Samos was among the allies of Athens who revolted to Sparta in 413/2 immediately on hearing news of the Sicilian disaster. With this brief notice is to be associated a fragmentary Athenian decree rewarding

¹⁰⁸ Meiggs, p. 190, canvasses the possibly relevant grievances of individual Peloponnesian League allies of Sparta, but these are pale shadows of the αἰτίαι καὶ διαφοραί of 432 retailed by Thucydides.

¹⁰⁹ The form of the aid requested by the Samians and/or envisaged by the Spartans is an open question. In 433/2 'the Spartan authorities' promised to assist the Poteidaians in their revolt from Athens by invading Attika (Thuc. 1. 58. 1, 71. 4), but τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων may mean just the Ephors and there is no mention of a Peloponnesian League Congress: Ste. Croix, *Origins*, pp. 203 f. and n. 108. In 441/0, therefore, it cannot be excluded that the Spartans envisaged some sort of naval assistance to Samos; hence perhaps the crucial significance of Corinth's opposition to the motion.

¹¹⁰ So Legon (n. 98), 154–7; though the explicit statement of Diodorus (12. 28. 4) does not prove it. This, the standard, view is disputed by Will (n. 98), 312–19, who believes that from 439 to 412 Samos was ruled mildly by an oligarchy. See now A. Andrewes in A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* v (Oxford, 1981), pp. 45 f.

¹¹¹ The coinage struck by these exiles at Anaia was dated by Barron (n. 98), p. 93, to c. 430, but has been redated by Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins*, p. 333 (coin No. 883) to 412, when the (as he and I believe) re-established oligarchy was once more overturned by a democratic revolution. For a possible reference to the Anaia exiles in a context of 428 or 427 (*Vita Soph.* 9) see L. Woodbury, 'Sophocles among the Generals', *Phoenix* 24 (1970), 213–15.

the Samian *demos* for its loyalty, which refers to 'the Samians who brought in the Spartans'.¹¹²

This time the Samian democrats were not as lenient towards their vanquished political enemies as they may perhaps have been after old scores had been settled in 439: 'The Samian *demos* killed altogether about 200 of the most influential men (τῶν δυνατωτάτων), exiled 400 more and distributed amongst themselves their land and houses. The Athenians thereupon voted them independence (αὐτονομίαν), since they viewed them as being now reliable. The *demos* took over control of the city for the future, excluding the Geomoroi completely from the government. And thenceforth intermarriage between the Geomoroi and the *demos* was prohibited' (Thuc. 8. 21). Two attempted counter-coups failed. For the remainder of the Peloponnesian War the Samian democracy stayed fiercely – and crucially – loyal to Athens, even after the disaster of Aigospotamoi in 405. In return the Athenians, in the interval between that disaster and their final capitulation to Lysander in April 404, made the Samians a unique block grant of Athenian citizenship, or rather *isopoliteia*, together with other privileges.¹¹³

Once Athens had fallen, the grant was of course a positive liability, since it can only have increased the determination of the rabidly anti-democratic and anti-Athenian Lysander personally to restore a puppet oligarchy in Samos. This he finally succeeded in doing after a siege lasting the whole summer of 404 (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 3. 6–7; Diod. 14. 3. 5; Plut. *Mor.* 233d). But not even the bloodstained history of *stasis* on Samos between 441 and 404, especially the phase beginning in 412, nor the rôle played by Samos in relations between Athens and Sparta – not even these could have led us to anticipate the sequel. The Skionians in 423 had publicly honoured their Spartan liberator, Brasidas, with a golden crown (Thuc. 4. 121. 1),¹¹⁴ the Amphipolitans had honoured him posthumously with the hero-cult of a founder in 422 (Thuc. 5. 11. 1). But the restored Samian oligarchs honoured Lysander by raising him to the status of the immortals. The literary evidence for this, the first attested instance of the deification of a living mortal in Greece, was naturally suspected to be a fabrication or at least exaggeration, since its source was Douris (76F26, 71, *ap.* Plut. *Lys.* 18). But a recently discovered fourth-century inscription has confirmed the deification by revealing that the oligarchs took the extraordinary step of renaming their most important festival, the Heraia, the Lysandreia.¹¹⁵

Part of the explanation must lie in the character of the contemporary Samian class struggle on the political plane. Another part is no doubt to be sought in the somewhat megalomaniacal psyche of the honorand; though even Lysander, if we may use the evidence of the official victor-monument of Aigospotamoi set up at Delphi, had not

¹¹² IG j² 101, with D. M. Lewis, *BSA* 49 (1954), 29–31; cf. Meiggs, p. 457; and Andrewes (n. 110), p. 47, who stresses that 'it certainly must not be argued from Thucydides' silence that there had not been an oligarchic seizure of power shortly before 412'. For another view of the 412 events, see W. Schuller, 'Die Einführung der Demokratie auf Samos im 5. Jahrhundert', *Klio* n.f. 63 (1981), 233–45.

¹¹³ M/L 94 = Fornara, No. 166; cf. W. Gawantka, *Isopolitie* (Munich, 1975), pp. 178–97; J. K. Davies, 'Athenian citizenship: the descent group and the alternatives', *CJ* 73 (1977–8), 105–21, at p. 107. The *probouleuma* was introduced by a unique formula 'to emphasise that the proposal was unanimous': M/L, p. 287. The original stele was perhaps destroyed under the Thirty, since what we have is a copy reinscribed in 403 together with two other decrees that confirmed and extended the privileges granted to the Samians in 405. For the coinage of the Samian democracy of 412–04 see Barron, *Silver Coins*, pp. 96–101.

¹¹⁴ I take this opportunity of correcting errors in my *Sparta and Lakonia*, p. 268.

¹¹⁵ Chr. Habicht, *Gottmenschentum und gr. Städte*² (Munich, 1970), pp. 3–7, 243 f. The inscription is *AA* 1965, 440 and fig. 10.

hitherto gone so far as to ascribe *divine* status to himself.¹¹⁶ A further and possibly decisive causal factor can therefore be contemplated: the special relationship between Sparta and Samos. Earlier Spartan interest in the Samian Heraion may have made the renaming of the Heraia seem peculiarly appropriate.¹¹⁷ The close personal connections between Spartan and Samian aristocrats, which by 404 could have stretched back over some three centuries, might have induced the latter in a paroxysm of gratitude to step beyond the bounds of orthodox Greek views on the nature of man and so make a pregnant contribution to Greek theology.¹¹⁸

Clare College, Cambridge

PAUL CARTLEDGE

¹¹⁶ M/L 95; Paus. 10. 9. 7–10. The date of the lettering of the epigram commemorating Lysander is disputed: M/L, p. 288, say 'probably of the second half of the fourth century', whereas J. Bousquet, *BCH* 80 (1956), 580 f., was prepared to put it as early as 400. The composer of the epigram was the Samian Ion. (See now J.-F. Bommelaer, *Lysandre de Sparte. Histoire et traditions* [Paris, 1981], which came into my hands after this article had been accepted for publication.)

¹¹⁷ I owe this suggestion to Stephen Hodkinson.

¹¹⁸ The genesis of this article lies in a question put to me by L. H. Jeffery at an Oxford graduate seminar in 1970; I hope that my answer will find at least some favour with her. An earlier version was delivered to the Triennial Meeting of the Hellenic and Roman Societies at Cambridge in 1978. For helpful criticism of this and subsequent drafts I am indebted to J. P. Barron, J. Boardman, R. M. Cook, S. J. Hodkinson, G. L. Huxley, B. M. Mitchell, and A. M. Snodgrass. The errors that remain are entirely my responsibility.